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I. INTRODUCTION
As the global economic crisis deepens, even the governments of major
market economies are susceptible to domestic political pressures to adopt
protectionist trade policies. In a speech given at the University of California,
Berkeley in October 2008, Pascal Lamy, the Director-General of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), stated that restoring citizens' confidence in
international trade requires governments to ensure that sound domestic
policies are in place. The domestic decisionmaking process must be capable of
synthesizing diverse and occasionally conflicting points of view into solid
domestic policies. Issues related to free trade are no longer centered on the
loss of jobs and the undermining of domestic industries. Contemporary issues
include public health and safety concerns that affect the broader community,
not merely a subset of the population. Now that ordinary citizens and civil
society groups are able to disseminate and receive information instantly
through the internet, they are increasingly capable of shaping international
trade issues and influencing public opinions and government policy. A sound
domestic decisionmaking process relating to international trade must consider
all of these factors, adding to the complexity of the balancing process.
Balancing interests among domestic constituents through an orderly
political or administrative process is a challenge for both mature democratic
societies and rapidly democratizing countries like Korea. If the domestic
decisionmaking process relating to international treaties does not produce
policies that are substantively and procedurally sound, the rule of law may be
undermined. This could, as a result, undercut the ability of the government to
negotiate, conclude, and execute international agreements.
The controversy surrounding the resumption of importation of American
beef into Korea in 2008 exemplifies the complexity of balancing competing
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interests in a country that is in transition to full democratic maturity. While an
elaborate domestic decisionmaking framework is detailed in the Korean
Constitution and national laws, in practice, the decisionmaking process is not
always orderly when it involves economically, socially, and politically
sensitive issues. But when the domestic balancing process fails, it has serious
repercussions for international law. In light of the current global economic
crisis and countries' growing inclinations towards protectionist trade policies,
Korea's experience with the U.S. beef import issue may be repeated in other
parts of the world. 1 Particularly under these conditions, a sound domestic
decisionmaking process becomes all the more critical to the viability of our
international trading system.
This Essay reviews the Korean Administrative Procedure Act (KAPA)2
and its implications for the Korea-U.S. Beef Import Agreement as set forth in
the Agreed Minutes (Agreement) 3 to analyze the legal status of the Agreement
under international law and to understand whether Korea's commitment to
implement the Agreement is unconditional or subject to KAPA's domestic
procedural requirement for public notice and comment. I conclude that the
Agreement is valid under international law, but that its implementation is
subject to KAPA based on the Agreement's explicit recognition of the KAPA
requirement. Consequently, the implementation of the Agreement and the
domestic balancing process required by KAPA are bridged by the recognition
of KAPA in the Agreement itself.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Korea was the third largest export market for American beef until the
Korean government banned U.S. beef imports when mad cow disease was
first reported in the United States in December 2003. Resumption of the
importation of U.S. beef has since emerged as a delicate trade issue. When
Korea expressed its intent to negotiate a free trade agreement with the United
States in 2005, certain members of the U.S. government made clear that their
support of the free trade agreement depended on whether Korea reopens the
market to imported U.S. beef.4 However, trade officials in Korea cautiously
maintained that the importation of American beef was not a prerequisite to
beginning the two countries' free trade agreement negotiation 5 out of concern
I. E.g., Malaysians Protest Against Free Trade Talks with U.S., THIRD WORLD NETWORK,
June 13, 2006, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/FTAs/info.service/fta.info.serviceO13.htm. Other
examples include Thailand and Malaysia's free trade agreements with the United States. Both countries'
citizens emphasized health concerns by protesting against the banning of generic medicines.
2. Heng Jung Jul Cha Bup [Administrative Procedure Act (KAPA)], Act No. 5241, Dec. 31,
1996, amended by Act. No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008 (S. Korea) [hereinafter Korean Administrative
Procedure Act].
3. Agreed Minutes of the Korea-United States Consultation on Beef, U.S.-S. Korea, Apr.
18, 2008 (on file with author) [hereinafter Agreed Minutes].
4. See, e.g., Press Release, Rob Portman, U.S. Trade Representative, Press Conference at
Closing of APEC Trade Minister's Meeting (June 3, 2005), http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/
Transcripts/2005/June/USTR-Portman-Press-_Conference-atClosing-.of-APEC-Trade-Ministers-
Meeting.html.
5. Press Release, Ministry for Food, Agric., Forestry, and Fisheries, Korea, U.S. May
Compromise over Beef Trade Row, Seoul's Ambassador Says (Feb. 11, 2007), http://english.mifaff
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that the Korean public would misunderstand the government's action as
exchanging the people's health for the free trade agreement.
Shortly before both governments announced their intention to negotiate
a free trade agreement in February 2006, the Korean government agreed to a
partial lifting of the import ban on U.S. beef; Korea would allow the
importation of boneless U.S. beef derived from cattle less than thirty months
old (believed to be at less risk of mad cow disease). Pursuant to relevant
Korean law,6 the terms and conditions of.the partial import agreement were
implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture in the form of a ministry
"notification" (gosi in Korean). KAPA requires that before any ministry
introduces and implements a notification, it must publish the highlights of the
notification to the general public and solicit public comments. The Ministry
of Agriculture followed the procedure under KAPA and the notification took
effect in March 2006 (2006 Notification). 8 Importation of American beef
resumed, but shortly afterwards the Korean government again prohibited the
importation of U.S. beef when pieces of bones were found in it. The
Agriculture Ministry held that the inclusion of bone chips in the imported beef
was a violation of the 2006 Notification. While U.S. exporters requested
reasonable bone chip tolerance for future shipments, the Korean government
maintained a strict stance. The Trade Minister stated that "the beef issue
should not be viewed as [a] market access issue, but a national health issue." 9
When bone chips were again found in a shipment to Korea, Korean
government placed a total ban on the importation of U.S. beef in October
2007 in response to mounting public concerns over the repeated violations of
the 2006 Notification by some U.S. beef exporters.
Meanwhile, two important developments occurred. First, following ten
months of intense negotiations, Korea and the United States signed the Korea-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) in June 2007.10 For the United
States, KORUS FTA is the first free trade agreement with a major Asian
economy. For Korea, it is the country's largest free trade agreement. As a next
step, both governments must seek approval of the KORUS FTA from their
respective legislatures.
Second, in May 2007, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)
identified the United States as a "controlled risk" country for Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy. 11 Based on the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and
.go.kr/USR/BORD020 I/m_380/DTL.jsp?id=B20201 000&mode=view&idx = 10903.
6. Act on the Prevention of Contagious Animal Diseases, amended by Act. No. 7434, Mar.
31, 2005 (S. Korea).
7. Korean Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 2, arts. 41-42.
8. Nong Rim Bu Go Si [Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Notification], Mi Kook San
Swe Go Gi Soo lp Wie Seng Jo Gun [Health Conditions for Importing U.S. Beef], No. 2006-15 (Mar. 6,
2006) (on file with author).
9. KOREA INST. FOR INT'L ECON. POLICY, FEASIBILITY AND EcONOMIC EFFECTS OF KOREA-
U.S. FTA 62 n.72 (Dec. 30, 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at
http://www.kiep.go.kr/common/board filedown.asp? 131932.
10. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States and the Republic of
Korea Sign Landmark Free Trade Agreement (June 30, 2007), http://ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/Press
_Releases/2007/June/UnitedStates-the-Repubic of Korea-Sign-LmarkFree..Trade-Agreement.
html.
11. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Statement by Secretary Mike Johanns Regarding
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Phytosanitary Measures, 12 the U.S. government demanded that Korea conform
to the WTO rules by eliminating the import ban. In particular, the United
States stipulated that Korea should expand the age limit of the cattle, allow
boned meat, and relax the inspection standard so that minute issues like small
bone chips do not trigger a suspension of imported U.S. beef. Influential
American politicians strongly signaled that they would not support the
KORUS FTA in Congress unless and until Korea resolves the U.S. beef
import issue. One day before the newly elected President Lee was scheduled
to meet President Bush in April 2008, the Korean Agriculture Ministry
announced that it had agreed with the United States to lift the import ban on
U.S. beef. As the implementation of the Agreement required an amendment to
the 2006 Notification, the Ministry published the major contents of the new
Beef Import Agreement and sought public opinion pursuant to KAPA.
When the contents of the Agreement became known to the Korean
public, journalists, and civil society groups, they requested to know the basis
for this seemingly sudden shift in policy and whether the government had
taken due consideration of the citizens' health and safety when it agreed to
expand the scope of U.S. beef shipped to Korea and to relax inspection
standards.' 3 In response, the government explained that the U.S. beef to be
imported was the same safe beef that Americans consumed daily and that
Korea had to accept the OIE international standard unless objective scientific
grounds justified deviation from the OIE guidelines. Special hearings were
held at the National Assembly, but failed to ease the public's concerns. Soon
mass demonstrations took place in the streets of Seoul. Protestors demanded
renegotiation of the Agreement to reduce the scope of imported U.S. beef and
to restore Korea's full right to inspection. Opposition party politicians and
leaders of NGOs critical of the administration joined the crowds.
The government maintained that renegotiation was not legally possible
and that it would hurt Korea's international credibility. In light of the domestic
reaction, however, the Minister of Agriculture postponed finalization of the
amended notification. The Minister explained that the delay was due to the
fact that the public submitted more than three hundred opinions that the
Ministry needed time to review. When it became evident that the Korean
government was no longer in a position to ignore public opinion, it asked the
United States for additional consultations. On June 25, 2008, the Korean
government succeeded in securing additional safeguards in the form of a
"private sector initiative." The letter, which was jointly signed by then-U.S.
Trade Representative Susan Schwab and Secretary of Agriculture Edward
Schafer, confirms that Korea will import U.S. beef from cattle less than thirty
U.S. Classification by OIE (May 22, 2007), http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal?contentidonly=true&
contentid=2007/05/0149.xml.
12. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 2, para. 2,
Apr. 15, 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Annex IA, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs..e/legal e/1 7-tbt.pdf.
13. E.g., Thousands Protest U.S. Beef in S. Korea, CBS NEWS, May 31, 2008,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/05/31/world/main4I42669.shtml.
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months of age until Korean consumer confidence improves. 14 The Agriculture
Ministry published the amended notification that went into effect from June
26, 2008.15
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES
In responding to the demands for renegotiation of the Korea-U.S. Beef
Import Agreement, the options available to the Korean government depend on
(1) what the legal status of the Agreement is under international law, and (2)
whether Korea's commitment to implement the Agreement is unconditional or
subject to KAPA's procedures for public notice and comment.
Let us briefly review the details of the Agreement. On April 18, 2008,
the Deputy Minister of the Korean Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries and the Deputy Under Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture signed a five-page document entitled the Agreed Minutes of the
Korea-United States Consultation on Beef.16 The Agreement states that the
two delegations reached agreement on a new protocol for the importation of
beef and beef products from the United States into Korea, and a copy of the
agreed protocol is attached to the Agreement (Import Protocol).
With respect to the first question, opinions are split among Korean legal
scholars. Some legal scholars and jurists critical of the current Korean
government argue that the Agreement is not a valid international agreement
because it is simply a record of a "consultation," not a binding agreement. 17
Others argue that the substantive issues dealt with in the Agreement
significantly affect the health and safety of Korean citizens, and therefore
should not have been delegated to the ministry notification level. 18 The
argument follows that because the Agreement was signed by the Deputy
Minister without approval from the National Assembly or, at least by the state
cabinet, the Agreement has no legal status in Korea.'
9
However, the Korean government has rejected these arguments,
designating the Agreement to be a binding international agreement duly
signed by representatives of both countries. The Minister of Trade stated that
seeking renegotiation of a binding international agreement was not legally
possible, but proposed that the government would seek additional
14. Letter from Susan Schwab, U.S. Trade Representative & Edward Schafer, U.S. Sec'y of
Agric., to Jong Hoon Kim, S. Korea Minister for Trade & Woon Chun Chung, Minister for Food,
Agric., Forestry and Fisheries (June 25, 2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-
Library/Fact_- Sheets/2008/asset upload -file470_14958.pdf.
15. Nong Rim Soo San Sik Poom Bu Go Si [Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry &
Fisheries Notification], Mi Kook San Swe Go Gi Soo Ip Wie Seng Jo Gun [Health Conditions for
Importing U.S. Beef], No. 2008-15 (June 26, 2008) (on file with author).
16. Agreed Minutes, supra note 3.
17. Yang Gu Kang, Gook Ga Hyup Sang? Jong Hyun Kim Yi Dae Tong Ryung Gua Kook
Min Eul Sok Yi Ko It Da [Additional Negotiation? Jong Hyun Kim Is Deceiving the President and the
People], PRESSLAN, June 17, 2008, http://www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?article-num=
60080616213647 (interviewing the former Korean Minister of Agriculture).
18. Young Sok Kim, Han Mi Swe Go Gi Soo Ip Hab Eui Eui Kook Je Bub Juk Gum To [A
Review of the Korea-U.S. Beef Agreement from an International Law Perspective], 15 SEOUL KOOK JE
BUB YuN Goo [SEOUL INT'L L.J.] 29, 38-42 (2008) (S. Korea).
19. Id. at 41-44.
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consultations to address the public health and safety concerns with the U.S.
government.
Considering the parties' intentions as expressed in the wording of the
Agreement, and the signatures affixed to the Agreement, as well as the parties'
history of dealing with the same issue in 2006 (which led to the 2006
Notification), it is hardly convincing to argue that the Agreement is not a
binding agreement governed by international law.
With respect to the second question, it is important to point out that the
Agreement makes explicit references to both the Korean and the U.S.
administrative procedure laws. The reference to the administrative procedure
laws of both countries indicates that the representatives of each delegation
were fully cognizant of the fact that the implementation of the Agreement
would be subject to each state party's domestic processes as required by their
respective administrative procedure laws. This explicit reference to a domestic
rulemaking procedure raises the complex issue of how the internal procedural
requirement of KAPA (that public opinions be taken into consideration in the
government's decisionmaking process) can be integrated at the international
decisionmaking level.
Under Korean law, in order to implement the Agreement, the Agriculture
Ministry has to amend the 2006 Notification to reflect the terms and
conditions set forth in the Import Protocol. The amendment of the 2006
Notification is subject to the KAPA procedure. 20 The purpose of the public
comment process under KAPA is to guarantee public access to and
participation in the administrative rulemaking process, thus giving the people
the right to be publicly critical of a particular administrative regulation before
it becomes effective. KAPA states that the public comment period shall be for
at least twenty days. It also provides that any person has the right to offer his
or her opinion on the regulation and the government must treat such opinion
respectfully. If the regulation in question raises a diverse group of issues, then
the government may hold public hearings to facilitate the democratic process.
However, KAPA does not contain detailed guidelines on the standard of
treatment for the submitted public opinion.
Without clarifying the extent of Korea's obligations, that is, whether
Korea's promise to implement the Agreement is unconditional or contingent
upon KAPA's procedural requirements, the Korean government maintained
that the public opinions opposing the Import Protocol failed to present an
objective scientific basis to support their position.
According to Articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, a treaty must be performed in good faith and a party's internal law
cannot be invoked as an excuse for nonperformance of a treaty.21 If KAPA
were not specifically mentioned in the Agreement, then invoking KAPA
would not be justifiable under Article 27 of the Vienna Convention. However,
in this case, the Agreement states the following:
20. Korean Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 2, arts. 41-45.
21. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 26-27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
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Korea stated that no later than April 22, 2008, the Ministry for Food, Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries will publish for public comment the import health requirements for
beef and beef products contained in the protocol. As soon as the public comment period
required by Korea's Administrative Procedures Act closes (20 days after publication), the
protocol will be published as a final regulation.
22
While the language is somewhat vague, a strong argument can be made that
Korea's agreement to implement is qualified by the reference to KAPA, which
requires a public notice and opinion-seeking procedure. The Korean
government must "in good faith' 23 perform what it has agreed to, but it
reserved the right to subject the Agreement to KAPA's requirement.
Several important considerations support this argument. First, when
Korea agreed to partially resume importation of U.S. beef in 2006, the
Ministry of Agriculture abided by the same KAPA procedure. The U.S.
delegations were therefore aware of the KAPA requirement. Second, the chief
Korean negotiator was a deputy-minister-level officer who is required by law
to act in accordance with KAPA, and he did not have the authority to waive
the KAPA requirements during the negotiation process with the United States.
Furthermore, the Agreement explicitly states that the U.S. government will
conduct its obligations "within the parameters of the U.S. Administrative
Procedures [sic] Act." 24 Thus, it is logical that the Korean government is
similarly obligated to implement the Agreement subject to the requirements of
KAPA.
Certainly, Korea must perform the Agreement in good faith and refrain
from taking any action that defeats its object and purpose. If the Ministry finds,
however, in the course of complying with KAPA, that the public raised
substantial health concerns relating to the Agreement, the Minister must take
appropriate measures to address the concerns, for instance, holding public
hearings or organizing a special task force to examine the scientific basis of
the issues. If, through this process, scientific evidence that supports public
objection to the implementation of the Agreement arises, then Korea may
decide not to implement the Agreement as originally agreed and may demand
renegotiation to the extent justified by the objective scientific evidence.
Whether the United States accepts such demand for renegotiation or not is a
decision to be made by the U.S. government. What is important is that
Korea's failure to implement the Agreement should not be viewed as a breach
of the Agreement as long as Korea acted in good faith.
Although the Korean government deliberately created the appearance
that it would not seek renegotiation, in reality, the additional consultations
preceding the finalization of the amended notification on the American beef
Import Protocol were in substance supportive of the interpretation that
Korea's commitment under the Agreement was subject to the KAPA
requirement. In hindsight, if the Korean government had taken the position
from the outset that the Agreement was subject to the KAPA procedure, thus
faithfully following the KAPA procedure and giving more respect to public
22. Agreed Minutes, supra note 3, at 5.
23. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 26.
24. Agreed Minutes, supra note 3, at 2, 3; see also id. at 4 (using similar language).
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opinion in the consensus-building process, it might have been more successful
in having the Beef Import Agreement implemented in an orderly manner. The
public debate would have been focused on verifying whether there was an
objective scientific basis for the health and safety concerns raised over
American beef rather than being a highly politicized spectacle filled with
polarizing rhetoric and physical confrontation between the so-called
conservatives and progressives.
IV. CONCLUSION
Korea faces the critical challenge of upgrading its domestic
decisionmaking processes relating to international treatymaking. Until the late
1980s, policymaking in Korea was monopolized by a few political elites. Yet
with rapid democratization and an increasingly active civil society, demands
for meaningful public participation in Korea's decisionmaking process are
growing stronger. Ordinary citizens want their voices to be reflected in the
country's treaty decisionmaking process, especially on issues that affect their
health, safety, and living environments. Paradoxically, the position the Korean
government took in the U.S. beef controversy in order to maintain its
international credibility ultimately hurt the government's domestic credibility,
which in turn weakened its ability to perform its international commitments.
The U.S. beef controversy highlights the need for trade negotiators to
carefully consider the domestic decisionmaking process of their counterparties
when negotiating international agreements. It also teaches us the increasingly
important role that domestic policymaking processes play, especially in our
currently charged global economic environment, in maintaining the viability
of our international legal system.
